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refactor(datadog-ffe)!: rename crate so it can be published to crates.io - #2285

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refactor(datadog-ffe)!: rename crate so it can be published to crates.io#2285
hoolioh wants to merge 14 commits into
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julio/publish-ffe

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@hoolioh

@hoolioh hoolioh commented Jul 28, 2026

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What does this PR do?

This PR makes the proper changes to publish FFE crate, for that the crate name has to be renamed in order to adhere to the repo publishing policies and dependants references updated.

Motivation

Allow downstream projects to use independent versions.

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Clippy Allow Annotation Report

Tracked Clippy allow annotations changed vs main: ⚠️ +1 (0 → 1)

Rule Base PR Δ
expect_used 0 1 ⚠️ +1
By file and crate

By file

File Base PR Δ
libdd-ffe-ffi/src/handle.rs 0 1 ⚠️ +1

By crate

Crate Base PR Δ
libdd-ffe-ffi 0 1 ⚠️ +1

About This Report

This report tracks Clippy allow annotations for specific rules, showing how they've changed in this PR. Decreasing the number of these annotations generally improves code quality. Panic-inducing macros in particular should be avoided. In the future, this report may become a PR-blocking quality gate.

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Tests

🎉 All green!

🧪 All tests passed
❄️ No new flaky tests detected

🎯 Code Coverage (details)
Patch Coverage: 100.00%
Overall Coverage: 74.82% (-0.12%)

This comment will be updated automatically if new data arrives.
🔗 Commit SHA: e9949e8 | Docs | Datadog PR Page | Give us feedback!

@hoolioh hoolioh changed the title Julio/publish ffe refactor(datadog-ffe)!: rename crate so it can be published to crates.io Jul 28, 2026
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Benchmarks

Comparison

Benchmark execution time: 2026-07-31 08:44:16

Comparing candidate commit e9949e8 in PR branch julio/publish-ffe with baseline commit 7b8cb2a in branch main.

Found 0 performance improvements and 0 performance regressions! Performance is the same for 140 metrics, 0 unstable metrics.

Explanation

This is an A/B test comparing a candidate commit's performance against that of a baseline commit. Performance changes are noted in the tables below as:

  • 🟩 = significantly better candidate vs. baseline
  • 🟥 = significantly worse candidate vs. baseline

We compute a confidence interval (CI) over the relative difference of means between metrics from the candidate and baseline commits, considering the baseline as the reference.

If the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD), the change is considered significant.

Feel free to reach out to #apm-benchmarking-platform on Slack if you have any questions.

More details about the CI and significant changes

You can imagine this CI as a range of values that is likely to contain the true difference of means between the candidate and baseline commits.

CIs of the difference of means are often centered around 0%, because often changes are not that big:

---------------------------------(------|---^--------)-------------------------------->
                              -0.6%    0%  0.3%     +1.2%
                                 |          |        |
         lower bound of the CI --'          |        |
sample mean (center of the CI) -------------'        |
         upper bound of the CI ----------------------'

As described above, a change is considered significant if the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD).

For instance, for an execution time metric, this confidence interval indicates a significantly worse performance:

----------------------------------------|---------|---(---------^---------)---------->
                                       0%        1%  1.3%      2.2%      3.1%
                                                  |   |         |         |
       significant impact threshold --------------'   |         |         |
                      lower bound of CI --------------'         |         |
       sample mean (center of the CI) --------------------------'         |
                      upper bound of CI ----------------------------------'

Benchmark execution time: 2026-07-31 08:54:36

Comparing candidate commit e9949e8 in PR branch julio/publish-ffe with baseline commit 7b8cb2a in branch main.

Found 22 performance improvements and 4 performance regressions! Performance is the same for 140 metrics, 10 unstable metrics.

Explanation

This is an A/B test comparing a candidate commit's performance against that of a baseline commit. Performance changes are noted in the tables below as:

  • 🟩 = significantly better candidate vs. baseline
  • 🟥 = significantly worse candidate vs. baseline

We compute a confidence interval (CI) over the relative difference of means between metrics from the candidate and baseline commits, considering the baseline as the reference.

If the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD), the change is considered significant.

Feel free to reach out to #apm-benchmarking-platform on Slack if you have any questions.

More details about the CI and significant changes

You can imagine this CI as a range of values that is likely to contain the true difference of means between the candidate and baseline commits.

CIs of the difference of means are often centered around 0%, because often changes are not that big:

---------------------------------(------|---^--------)-------------------------------->
                              -0.6%    0%  0.3%     +1.2%
                                 |          |        |
         lower bound of the CI --'          |        |
sample mean (center of the CI) -------------'        |
         upper bound of the CI ----------------------'

As described above, a change is considered significant if the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD).

For instance, for an execution time metric, this confidence interval indicates a significantly worse performance:

----------------------------------------|---------|---(---------^---------)---------->
                                       0%        1%  1.3%      2.2%      3.1%
                                                  |   |         |         |
       significant impact threshold --------------'   |         |         |
                      lower bound of CI --------------'         |         |
       sample mean (center of the CI) --------------------------'         |
                      upper bound of CI ----------------------------------'

scenario:alloc_free/system/4096

  • 🟩 execution_time [-16.481ns; -16.319ns] or [-17.649%; -17.476%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number/ 378282246310005

  • 🟩 execution_time [-6.464µs; -6.337µs] or [-8.715%; -8.544%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+1261062.861op/s; +1284414.634op/s] or [+9.354%; +9.527%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number/378282246310005

  • 🟩 execution_time [-6.148µs; -5.996µs] or [-8.680%; -8.465%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+1307747.001op/s; +1338198.260op/s] or [+9.262%; +9.478%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number/37828224631000521389798

  • 🟩 execution_time [-8.184µs; -8.156µs] or [-15.386%; -15.333%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+3405076.593op/s; +3418281.673op/s] or [+18.112%; +18.182%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number/x371413321323331

  • 🟩 execution_time [-739.402ns; -737.123ns] or [-11.474%; -11.439%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+20047337.657op/s; +20109737.378op/s] or [+12.919%; +12.959%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number_no_luhn/ 3782-8224-6310-005

  • 🟩 execution_time [-4.194µs; -4.066µs] or [-6.425%; -6.229%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+1018650.411op/s; +1051955.767op/s] or [+6.649%; +6.866%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number_no_luhn/ 378282246310005

  • 🟩 execution_time [-5.177µs; -5.114µs] or [-8.780%; -8.673%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+1611864.677op/s; +1630906.351op/s] or [+9.504%; +9.616%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number_no_luhn/378282246310005

  • 🟩 execution_time [-5.405µs; -5.348µs] or [-9.700%; -9.598%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+1906973.461op/s; +1925760.146op/s] or [+10.626%; +10.731%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number_no_luhn/37828224631000521389798

  • 🟩 execution_time [-8.184µs; -8.150µs] or [-15.394%; -15.330%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+3406858.423op/s; +3421651.719op/s] or [+18.112%; +18.190%]

scenario:credit_card/is_card_number_no_luhn/x371413321323331

  • 🟩 execution_time [-740.565ns; -736.651ns] or [-11.490%; -11.430%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+20026321.518op/s; +20139670.018op/s] or [+12.907%; +12.980%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_case_insensitive_match/wall_time

  • 🟥 execution_time [+2.949ns; +2.965ns] or [+11.062%; +11.125%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_exact_match/wall_time

  • 🟥 execution_time [+2.937ns; +2.962ns] or [+11.020%; +11.112%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_exact_miss/wall_time

  • 🟥 execution_time [+2.294ns; +2.365ns] or [+18.395%; +18.965%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_pattern_unicode_subject/wall_time

  • 🟥 execution_time [+8.894ns; +9.002ns] or [+6.503%; +6.582%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_wildcard_question_match/wall_time

  • 🟩 execution_time [-21.375ns; -21.356ns] or [-36.696%; -36.664%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_wildcard_star_match/wall_time

  • 🟩 execution_time [-21.373ns; -21.352ns] or [-36.685%; -36.651%]

scenario:sql/obfuscate_sql_string

  • 🟩 execution_time [-27.614µs; -27.387µs] or [-8.914%; -8.840%]

Candidate

Omitted due to size.

Baseline

Omitted due to size.

@dd-octo-sts

dd-octo-sts Bot commented Jul 28, 2026

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Artifact Size Benchmark Report

aarch64-alpine-linux-musl
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/aarch64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 87.32 MB 87.32 MB -0% (-4.89 KB) 👌
/aarch64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 8.01 MB 8.01 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 98.55 MB 98.55 MB -0% (-4.78 KB) 👌
/aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 10.78 MB 10.78 MB -0% (-136 B) 👌
libdatadog-x64-windows
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 26.05 MB 26.05 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 89.60 KB 89.60 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 188.10 MB 188.07 MB --.01% (-32.00 KB) 💪
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 980.77 MB 980.68 MB -0% (-91.40 KB) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 8.49 MB 8.49 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 89.60 KB 89.60 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 25.10 MB 25.10 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 49.93 MB 49.92 MB -0% (-1.45 KB) 👌
libdatadog-x86-windows
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 22.69 MB 22.69 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 91.00 KB 91.00 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 192.86 MB 192.83 MB --.01% (-24.00 KB) 💪
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 969.41 MB 969.32 MB -0% (-91.39 KB) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 6.56 MB 6.56 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 91.00 KB 91.00 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 26.97 MB 26.97 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 47.53 MB 47.53 MB -0% (-1.19 KB) 👌
x86_64-alpine-linux-musl
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/x86_64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 77.87 MB 77.87 MB -0% (-4.94 KB) 👌
/x86_64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 8.93 MB 8.93 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 93.36 MB 93.36 MB -0% (-4.24 KB) 👌
/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 10.87 MB 10.87 MB -0% (-144 B) 👌

@hoolioh
hoolioh force-pushed the julio/publish-ffe branch from b5b9efa to 3a48c64 Compare July 29, 2026 08:20
@hoolioh
hoolioh marked this pull request as ready for review July 29, 2026 10:02
@hoolioh
hoolioh requested review from a team as code owners July 29, 2026 10:02
@hoolioh
hoolioh requested review from pavlokhrebto and typotter and removed request for a team July 29, 2026 10:02

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Comment thread libdd-ffe-ffi/CHANGELOG.md Outdated
@hoolioh
hoolioh force-pushed the julio/publish-ffe branch from f05567d to 560c605 Compare July 29, 2026 13:16
@hoolioh
hoolioh force-pushed the julio/publish-ffe branch from 560c605 to f8b548b Compare July 29, 2026 13:31
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📚 Documentation Check Results

⚠️ 4950 documentation warning(s) found

📦 builder - 239 warning(s)

📦 datadog-sidecar - 2836 warning(s)

📦 libdd-ffe-ffi - 546 warning(s)

📦 libdd-ffe-test-suite - ✅ No warnings

📦 libdd-ffe - 385 warning(s)

📦 libdd-profiling-ffi - 771 warning(s)

📦 tools - 173 warning(s)


Updated: 2026-07-31 08:14:50 UTC | Commit: 5c588fd | missing-docs job results

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🔒 Cargo Deny Results

⚠️ 21 issue(s) found, showing only errors (advisories, bans, sources)

📦 builder - 3 error(s)

Show output
error[vulnerability]: Quadratic run time when checking a start tag for duplicate attribute names
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:81:1
   │
81 │ quick-xml 0.37.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0194
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0194
   ├ `BytesStart::attributes()` returns an `Attributes` iterator which, by default
     (`with_checks(true)`), rejects a start tag that repeats an attribute name. For
     each attribute yielded, the iterator compared the new name against every name
     seen so far in the same tag using a linear scan, so a start tag with `N`
     distinct attribute names cost `O(N²)` byte comparisons. There was no bound on
     `N` other than the size of the buffered start tag.
     
     ## Impact
     
     Any code that parses untrusted XML and iterates a start tag's attributes with
     the default duplicate check enabled can be made to spend CPU time quadratic in
     the number of attributes on a single tag. Because the check is pure computation
     with no `.await`/I/O, an I/O-based timeout on the consumer (for example a read
     or request timeout) cannot interrupt it while it runs.
     
     Measured cost of a single start tag, release build:
     
     | Attributes on one tag | Time |
     |---|---|
     | 80,000  | ~6 s   |
     | 800,000 | ~10 min |
     
     The cost grows with the square of the attribute count, so a start tag of a few
     tens of megabytes can stall a parsing thread for hours. No memory is exhausted
     and the parser does not crash; the effect is CPU exhaustion on the thread doing
     the parsing: a single crafted start tag can pin a CPU core for minutes to hours,
     denying service to that worker. A deployment that places a wall-clock bound on
     parsing, or confines it to a non-critical thread, may consider the availability
     impact lower.
     
     ## Affected code paths
     
     * `BytesStart::attributes()` / `Attributes` iterated with checks enabled (the
       default), and `BytesStart::try_get_attribute`.
     * `NsReader`, which resolves namespaces by iterating a tag's attributes and so
       reaches the same check internally.
     
     Consumers that iterate attributes with `.attributes().with_checks(false)` and do
     not use `NsReader` are not affected.
     
     This was reported as reachable by a remote, unauthenticated attacker in a
     real-world RPKI relying party (NLnet Labs Routinator) via a crafted RRDP
     `snapshot.xml`.
     
     ## Remediation
     
     Upgrade to `quick-xml >= 0.41.0`, where the duplicate check keeps the linear
     scan for start tags with a small number of attributes and switches to an `O(1)`
     hash pre-filter above a threshold, making the whole tag `O(N)`. The reported
     `AttrError::Duplicated` positions are unchanged.
     
     If upgrading is not possible and duplicate-name detection is not required,
     disable it with `.attributes().with_checks(false)` (this does not help
     `NsReader` consumers, which have no equivalent opt-out before 0.41.0).
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/tafia/quick-xml/issues/969
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.41.0 (try `cargo update -p quick-xml`)
   ├ quick-xml v0.37.5
     └── tools v38.0.0
         └── builder v38.0.0

error[vulnerability]: Unbounded namespace-declaration allocation in `NsReader` enables memory-exhaustion denial of service
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:81:1
   │
81 │ quick-xml 0.37.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0195
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0195
   ├ `NsReader` resolves namespaces by calling `NamespaceResolver::push` for every
     `Start`/`Empty` event *before* the event is returned to the caller. `push`
     iterated all `xmlns` / `xmlns:*` attributes on the start tag and, for each one,
     appended the prefix bytes to an internal buffer and pushed a `NamespaceBinding`
     (32 bytes on 64-bit) to an internal `Vec`, with no upper bound on the number of
     declarations.
     
     ## Impact
     
     A start tag with `N` namespace declarations drove roughly `3×` the tag's byte
     size in `NamespaceResolver` heap, allocated *inside* `quick-xml` before the
     `NsReader` consumer ever received the event and could inspect or reject it. A
     consumer that bounds its *input* size therefore still cannot bound this
     allocation: an `M`-byte start tag yields on the order of `3 × M` bytes of
     resolver heap the caller never sees.
     
     On untrusted XML this lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker force large heap
     allocations with a single start tag. With several `NsReader`s running
     concurrently on independent inputs (a common server pattern), the allocations
     stack and can exhaust process memory, causing the operating system to kill the
     process (OOM). This was confirmed against a real-world RPKI relying party (NLnet
     Labs Routinator), where concurrent RRDP validation workers parsing a crafted
     `snapshot.xml` exceeded the memory limit and the process was OOM-killed.
     
     ## Affected code paths
     
     Consumers using `NsReader` (which always calls `NamespaceResolver::push` before
     yielding `Start`/`Empty`), or calling `NamespaceResolver::push` directly. A plain
     `Reader` that does not perform namespace resolution is not affected.
     
     ## Remediation
     
     Upgrade to `quick-xml >= 0.41.0`. `NamespaceResolver::push` now rejects a start
     tag that declares more than `DEFAULT_MAX_DECLARATIONS_PER_ELEMENT` (256)
     namespace bindings, returning the new `NamespaceError::TooManyDeclarations`
     instead of allocating without limit. The limit is configurable via
     `NamespaceResolver::set_max_declarations_per_element` (use `usize::MAX` to
     restore the previous unbounded behavior), and `NsReader::resolver_mut()` is
     provided to reach it.
     
     There is no clean workaround for `NsReader` consumers before 0.41.0, as the
     allocation happens inside the reader with no configuration knob to cap it.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/tafia/quick-xml/issues/970
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.41.0 (try `cargo update -p quick-xml`)
   ├ quick-xml v0.37.5
     └── tools v38.0.0
         └── builder v38.0.0

error[unsound]: Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:84:1
   │
84 │ rand 0.8.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0097
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097
   ├ It has been reported (by [@lopopolo](https://github.com/lopopolo)) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
     
     - The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
     - A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined
     - The custom logger accesses `rand::rng()` (previously `rand::thread_rng()`) and calls any `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods on `ThreadRng`
     - The `ThreadRng` (attempts to) reseed while called from the custom logger (this happens every 64 kB of generated data)
     - Trace-level logging is enabled or warn-level logging is enabled and the random source (the `getrandom` crate) is unable to provide a new seed
     
     `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods for `ThreadRng` use `unsafe` code to cast `*mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>` to `&mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>`. When all the above conditions are met this results in an aliased mutable reference, violating the Stacked Borrows rules. Miri is able to detect this violation in sample code. Since construction of [aliased mutable references is Undefined Behaviour](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/nomicon/references.html), the behaviour of optimized builds is hard to predict.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/pull/1763
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.10.1 OR <0.10.0, >=0.9.3 OR <0.9.0, >=0.8.6 (try `cargo update -p rand`)
   ├ rand v0.8.5
     └── (dev) libdd-common v5.1.0
         ├── builder v38.0.0
         └── tools v38.0.0
             └── builder v38.0.0 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 datadog-sidecar - 4 error(s)

Show output
error[unmaintained]: Bincode is unmaintained
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:37:1
   │
37 │ bincode 1.3.3 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0141
   ├ Due to a doxxing and harassment incident, the bincode team has taken the decision to cease development permanently.
     
     The team considers version 1.3.3 a complete version of bincode that is not in need of any updates.
     
     ## Alternatives to consider
     
     * [wincode](https://crates.io/crates/wincode)
     * [postcard](https://crates.io/crates/postcard)
     * [bitcode](https://crates.io/crates/bitcode)
     * [rkyv](https://crates.io/crates/rkyv)
   ├ Announcement: https://git.sr.ht/~stygianentity/bincode/tree/v3.0/item/README.md
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bincode v1.3.3
     ├── datadog-ipc v0.1.0
     │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1
     └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Invalid pointer dereference in `fmt::Pointer` impl for `Atomic` and `Shared` when the underlying pointer is invalid
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:90:1
   │
90 │ crossbeam-epoch 0.9.18 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0204
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0204
   ├ Affected versions of `fmt::Display` dereference the underlying pointer. This causes a invalid pointer dereference e.g., when a pointer created with `Atomic::null` or `Shared::null`. `fmt::Debug` impls and pre-0.9 `fmt::Display` impls, which do not dereference pointers, are not affected by this issue.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/crossbeam-rs/crossbeam/pull/1276
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.9.20 (try `cargo update -p crossbeam-epoch`)
   ├ crossbeam-epoch v0.9.18
     └── crossbeam-deque v0.8.5
         └── rayon-core v1.12.1
             └── rayon v1.10.0
                 └── criterion v0.5.1
                     ├── (dev) datadog-ipc v0.1.0
                     │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1
                     ├── libdd-common v5.1.0
                     │   ├── datadog-ipc v0.1.0 (*)
                     │   ├── datadog-live-debugger v0.0.1
                     │   │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v3.0.0
                     │   │   ├── datadog-live-debugger v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   ├── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
                     │   │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   │   └── libdd-crashtracker-ffi v38.0.0
                     │   │   │       └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0
                     │   │   │   ├── datadog-live-debugger v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   ├── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0
                     │   │   │   ├── datadog-live-debugger v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   │   ├── (dev) datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   │   ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0
                     │   │   │   │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   │   └── (dev) libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)
                     │   │   ├── libdd-shared-runtime v2.0.0
                     │   │   │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
                     │   │   │   ├── libdd-dogstatsd-client v4.0.0
                     │   │   │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   │   │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
                     │   │   │   │   └── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0
                     │   │   │   │       ├── datadog-ipc v0.1.0 (*)
                     │   │   │   │       ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   │   │       └── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
                     │   │   │   ├── libdd-telemetry v6.0.0
                     │   │   │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   │   │   ├── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
                     │   │   │   │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
                     │   │   │   │   └── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
                     │   │   │   └── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
                     │   │   ├── (dev) libdd-telemetry v6.0.0 (*)
                     │   │   ├── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
                     │   │   └── libdd-trace-utils v9.0.0
                     │   │       ├── (dev) datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │       ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
                     │   │       ├── libdd-trace-obfuscation v5.0.0
                     │   │       │   └── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
                     │   │       ├── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
                     │   │       └── (dev) libdd-trace-utils v9.0.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-common-ffi v38.0.0
                     │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
                     │   │   └── libdd-crashtracker-ffi v38.0.0 (*)
                     │   ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-crashtracker-ffi v38.0.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-dogstatsd-client v4.0.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-shared-runtime v2.0.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-telemetry v6.0.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-trace-obfuscation v5.0.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
                     │   └── libdd-trace-utils v9.0.0 (*)
                     ├── (dev) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
                     ├── (dev) libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
                     ├── (dev) libdd-ddsketch v1.1.0
                     │   ├── datadog-ipc v0.1.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
                     │   ├── libdd-telemetry v6.0.0 (*)
                     │   └── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
                     ├── (dev) libdd-trace-normalization v3.0.0
                     │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
                     │   └── libdd-trace-utils v9.0.0 (*)
                     ├── (dev) libdd-trace-obfuscation v5.0.0 (*)
                     ├── (dev) libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
                     └── (dev) libdd-trace-utils v9.0.0 (*)

error[unsound]: Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:304:1
    │
304 │ rand 0.8.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ It has been reported (by [@lopopolo](https://github.com/lopopolo)) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
      
      - The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
      - A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined
      - The custom logger accesses `rand::rng()` (previously `rand::thread_rng()`) and calls any `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods on `ThreadRng`
      - The `ThreadRng` (attempts to) reseed while called from the custom logger (this happens every 64 kB of generated data)
      - Trace-level logging is enabled or warn-level logging is enabled and the random source (the `getrandom` crate) is unable to provide a new seed
      
      `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods for `ThreadRng` use `unsafe` code to cast `*mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>` to `&mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>`. When all the above conditions are met this results in an aliased mutable reference, violating the Stacked Borrows rules. Miri is able to detect this violation in sample code. Since construction of [aliased mutable references is Undefined Behaviour](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/nomicon/references.html), the behaviour of optimized builds is hard to predict.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/pull/1763
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.10.1 OR <0.10.0, >=0.9.3 OR <0.9.0, >=0.8.6 (try `cargo update -p rand`)
    ├ rand v0.8.5
      ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1
      ├── libdd-common v5.1.0
      │   ├── datadog-ipc v0.1.0
      │   │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   ├── datadog-live-debugger v0.0.1
      │   │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v3.0.0
      │   │   ├── datadog-live-debugger v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   ├── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0
      │   │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   │   └── libdd-crashtracker-ffi v38.0.0
      │   │   │       └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0
      │   │   │   ├── datadog-live-debugger v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   ├── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0
      │   │   │   ├── datadog-live-debugger v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── (dev) datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0
      │   │   │   │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   │   └── (dev) libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)
      │   │   ├── libdd-shared-runtime v2.0.0
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-dogstatsd-client v4.0.0
      │   │   │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   │   │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   │   └── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0
      │   │   │   │       ├── datadog-ipc v0.1.0 (*)
      │   │   │   │       ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   │   │       └── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   ├── libdd-telemetry v6.0.0
      │   │   │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   │   │   ├── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   │   └── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
      │   │   │   └── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
      │   │   ├── (dev) libdd-telemetry v6.0.0 (*)
      │   │   ├── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
      │   │   └── libdd-trace-utils v9.0.0
      │   │       ├── (dev) datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │       ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
      │   │       ├── libdd-trace-obfuscation v5.0.0
      │   │       │   └── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
      │   │       ├── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
      │   │       └── (dev) libdd-trace-utils v9.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-common-ffi v38.0.0
      │   │   ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   │   └── libdd-crashtracker-ffi v38.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── (build) libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-crashtracker-ffi v38.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-dogstatsd-client v4.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-shared-runtime v2.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-telemetry v6.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-trace-obfuscation v5.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
      │   └── libdd-trace-utils v9.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-crashtracker v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── (dev) libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
      ├── (dev) libdd-ddsketch v1.1.0
      │   ├── datadog-ipc v0.1.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-telemetry v6.0.0 (*)
      │   └── libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
      ├── (dev) libdd-trace-normalization v3.0.0
      │   ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
      │   └── libdd-trace-utils v9.0.0 (*)
      ├── (dev) libdd-trace-stats v6.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-trace-utils v9.0.0 (*)
      └── proptest v1.5.0
          └── (dev) libdd-tinybytes v1.1.1
              ├── datadog-ipc v0.1.0 (*)
              ├── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
              ├── libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0 (*)
              ├── (dev) libdd-tinybytes v1.1.1 (*)
              └── libdd-trace-utils v9.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:397:1
    │
397 │ time 0.3.41 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0009
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0009
    ├ ## Impact
      
      When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of
      service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and
      rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary,
      non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.
      
      ## Patches
      
      A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned
      rather than exhausting the stack.
      
      ## Workarounds
      
      Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of
      the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/time-rs/time/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#0347-2026-02-05
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.3.47 (try `cargo update -p time`)
    ├ time v0.3.41
      ├── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0
      │   ├── datadog-live-debugger v0.0.1
      │   │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1
      │   ├── (dev) datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0
      │   │   └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)
      │   └── (dev) libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)
      └── tracing-appender v0.2.3
          └── libdd-log v1.0.0
              └── (dev) libdd-data-pipeline v7.0.0
                  ├── datadog-live-debugger v0.0.1 (*)
                  └── datadog-sidecar v0.0.1 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-ffe-ffi - 2 error(s)

Show output
error[unsound]: Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:154:1
    │
154 │ rand 0.8.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ It has been reported (by [@lopopolo](https://github.com/lopopolo)) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
      
      - The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
      - A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined
      - The custom logger accesses `rand::rng()` (previously `rand::thread_rng()`) and calls any `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods on `ThreadRng`
      - The `ThreadRng` (attempts to) reseed while called from the custom logger (this happens every 64 kB of generated data)
      - Trace-level logging is enabled or warn-level logging is enabled and the random source (the `getrandom` crate) is unable to provide a new seed
      
      `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods for `ThreadRng` use `unsafe` code to cast `*mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>` to `&mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>`. When all the above conditions are met this results in an aliased mutable reference, violating the Stacked Borrows rules. Miri is able to detect this violation in sample code. Since construction of [aliased mutable references is Undefined Behaviour](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/nomicon/references.html), the behaviour of optimized builds is hard to predict.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/pull/1763
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.10.1 OR <0.10.0, >=0.9.3 OR <0.9.0, >=0.8.6 (try `cargo update -p rand`)
    ├ rand v0.8.5
      └── (dev) libdd-common v5.1.0
          ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v3.0.0
          │   └── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0
          │       ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0
          │       │   └── libdd-ffe-ffi v1.0.2
          │       └── (dev) libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)
          ├── libdd-common-ffi v38.0.0
          │   └── libdd-ffe-ffi v1.0.2 (*)
          ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0 (*)
          └── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:210:1
    │
210 │ time 0.3.41 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0009
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0009
    ├ ## Impact
      
      When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of
      service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and
      rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary,
      non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.
      
      ## Patches
      
      A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned
      rather than exhausting the stack.
      
      ## Workarounds
      
      Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of
      the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/time-rs/time/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#0347-2026-02-05
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.3.47 (try `cargo update -p time`)
    ├ time v0.3.41
      └── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0
          ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0
          │   └── libdd-ffe-ffi v1.0.2
          └── (dev) libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-ffe-test-suite - 3 error(s)

Show output
error[vulnerability]: Invalid pointer dereference in `fmt::Pointer` impl for `Atomic` and `Shared` when the underlying pointer is invalid
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:34:1
   │
34 │ crossbeam-epoch 0.9.18 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0204
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0204
   ├ Affected versions of `fmt::Display` dereference the underlying pointer. This causes a invalid pointer dereference e.g., when a pointer created with `Atomic::null` or `Shared::null`. `fmt::Debug` impls and pre-0.9 `fmt::Display` impls, which do not dereference pointers, are not affected by this issue.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/crossbeam-rs/crossbeam/pull/1276
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.9.20 (try `cargo update -p crossbeam-epoch`)
   ├ crossbeam-epoch v0.9.18
     └── crossbeam-deque v0.8.5
         └── rayon-core v1.12.1
             └── rayon v1.10.0
                 └── criterion v0.5.1
                     └── (dev) libdd-ffe-test-suite v38.0.0

error[unsound]: Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:145:1
    │
145 │ rand 0.8.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ It has been reported (by [@lopopolo](https://github.com/lopopolo)) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
      
      - The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
      - A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined
      - The custom logger accesses `rand::rng()` (previously `rand::thread_rng()`) and calls any `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods on `ThreadRng`
      - The `ThreadRng` (attempts to) reseed while called from the custom logger (this happens every 64 kB of generated data)
      - Trace-level logging is enabled or warn-level logging is enabled and the random source (the `getrandom` crate) is unable to provide a new seed
      
      `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods for `ThreadRng` use `unsafe` code to cast `*mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>` to `&mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>`. When all the above conditions are met this results in an aliased mutable reference, violating the Stacked Borrows rules. Miri is able to detect this violation in sample code. Since construction of [aliased mutable references is Undefined Behaviour](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/nomicon/references.html), the behaviour of optimized builds is hard to predict.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/pull/1763
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.10.1 OR <0.10.0, >=0.9.3 OR <0.9.0, >=0.8.6 (try `cargo update -p rand`)
    ├ rand v0.8.5
      └── (dev) libdd-common v5.1.0
          ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v3.0.0
          │   └── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0
          │       ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0
          │       │   └── (dev) libdd-ffe-test-suite v38.0.0
          │       └── (dev) libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)
          ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0 (*)
          └── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:199:1
    │
199 │ time 0.3.41 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0009
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0009
    ├ ## Impact
      
      When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of
      service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and
      rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary,
      non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.
      
      ## Patches
      
      A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned
      rather than exhausting the stack.
      
      ## Workarounds
      
      Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of
      the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/time-rs/time/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#0347-2026-02-05
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.3.47 (try `cargo update -p time`)
    ├ time v0.3.41
      └── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0
          ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0
          │   └── (dev) libdd-ffe-test-suite v38.0.0
          └── (dev) libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-ffe - 2 error(s)

Show output
error[unsound]: Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:120:1
    │
120 │ rand 0.8.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ It has been reported (by [@lopopolo](https://github.com/lopopolo)) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
      
      - The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
      - A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined
      - The custom logger accesses `rand::rng()` (previously `rand::thread_rng()`) and calls any `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods on `ThreadRng`
      - The `ThreadRng` (attempts to) reseed while called from the custom logger (this happens every 64 kB of generated data)
      - Trace-level logging is enabled or warn-level logging is enabled and the random source (the `getrandom` crate) is unable to provide a new seed
      
      `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods for `ThreadRng` use `unsafe` code to cast `*mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>` to `&mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>`. When all the above conditions are met this results in an aliased mutable reference, violating the Stacked Borrows rules. Miri is able to detect this violation in sample code. Since construction of [aliased mutable references is Undefined Behaviour](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/nomicon/references.html), the behaviour of optimized builds is hard to predict.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/pull/1763
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.10.1 OR <0.10.0, >=0.9.3 OR <0.9.0, >=0.8.6 (try `cargo update -p rand`)
    ├ rand v0.8.5
      └── (dev) libdd-common v5.1.0
          ├── libdd-capabilities-impl v3.0.0
          │   └── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0
          │       ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0
          │       └── (dev) libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)
          ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0 (*)
          └── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Denial of Service via Stack Exhaustion
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:171:1
    │
171 │ time 0.3.41 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0009
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0009
    ├ ## Impact
      
      When user-provided input is provided to any type that parses with the RFC 2822 format, a denial of
      service attack via stack exhaustion is possible. The attack relies on formally deprecated and
      rarely-used features that are part of the RFC 2822 format used in a malicious manner. Ordinary,
      non-malicious input will never encounter this scenario.
      
      ## Patches
      
      A limit to the depth of recursion was added in v0.3.47. From this version, an error will be returned
      rather than exhausting the stack.
      
      ## Workarounds
      
      Limiting the length of user input is the simplest way to avoid stack exhaustion, as the amount of
      the stack consumed would be at most a factor of the length of the input.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/time-rs/time/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#0347-2026-02-05
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.3.47 (try `cargo update -p time`)
    ├ time v0.3.41
      └── libdd-remote-config v2.0.0
          ├── libdd-ffe v0.1.0
          └── (dev) libdd-remote-config v2.0.0 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-profiling-ffi - 4 error(s)

Show output
error[vulnerability]: Invalid pointer dereference in `fmt::Pointer` impl for `Atomic` and `Shared` when the underlying pointer is invalid
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:56:1
   │
56 │ crossbeam-epoch 0.9.18 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0204
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0204
   ├ Affected versions of `fmt::Display` dereference the underlying pointer. This causes a invalid pointer dereference e.g., when a pointer created with `Atomic::null` or `Shared::null`. `fmt::Debug` impls and pre-0.9 `fmt::Display` impls, which do not dereference pointers, are not affected by this issue.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/crossbeam-rs/crossbeam/pull/1276
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.9.20 (try `cargo update -p crossbeam-epoch`)
   ├ crossbeam-epoch v0.9.18
     ├── crossbeam-deque v0.8.5
     │   └── rayon-core v1.12.1
     │       └── rayon v1.10.0
     │           └── criterion v0.5.1
     │               └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0
     │                   ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
     │                   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
     └── moka v0.12.13
         └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
             └── reqwest v0.13.2
                 ├── libdd-common v5.1.0
                 │   ├── libdd-common-ffi v38.0.0
                 │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
                 │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
                 │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
                 └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:89:1
   │
89 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
     `DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
     list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
     QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
     candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
     is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
     terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
     `Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
     
     The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
     resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
     `dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
     triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
     section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
     QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
     this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
     boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
     condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
     validation.
     
     A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
     abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
     compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
     process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
     can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
     exhaust memory on a release-built one.
     
     The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
     the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
     `DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
     0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-common v5.1.0
             │   ├── libdd-common-ffi v38.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:89:1
   │
89 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
     labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
     The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
     
     A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
     and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
     attacks.
     
     This is similar to
     [CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
     
     We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.26.1 (try `cargo update -p hickory-proto`)
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-common v5.1.0
             │   ├── libdd-common-ffi v38.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[unsound]: Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:170:1
    │
170 │ rand 0.8.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097
    ├ It has been reported (by [@lopopolo](https://github.com/lopopolo)) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
      
      - The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
      - A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined
      - The custom logger accesses `rand::rng()` (previously `rand::thread_rng()`) and calls any `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods on `ThreadRng`
      - The `ThreadRng` (attempts to) reseed while called from the custom logger (this happens every 64 kB of generated data)
      - Trace-level logging is enabled or warn-level logging is enabled and the random source (the `getrandom` crate) is unable to provide a new seed
      
      `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods for `ThreadRng` use `unsafe` code to cast `*mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>` to `&mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>`. When all the above conditions are met this results in an aliased mutable reference, violating the Stacked Borrows rules. Miri is able to detect this violation in sample code. Since construction of [aliased mutable references is Undefined Behaviour](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/nomicon/references.html), the behaviour of optimized builds is hard to predict.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/pull/1763
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.10.1 OR <0.10.0, >=0.9.3 OR <0.9.0, >=0.8.6 (try `cargo update -p rand`)
    ├ rand v0.8.5
      ├── libdd-common v5.1.0
      │   ├── libdd-common-ffi v38.0.0
      │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
      │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │   │   ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      └── proptest v1.5.0
          └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 tools - 3 error(s)

Show output
error[vulnerability]: Quadratic run time when checking a start tag for duplicate attribute names
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:72:1
   │
72 │ quick-xml 0.37.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0194
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0194
   ├ `BytesStart::attributes()` returns an `Attributes` iterator which, by default
     (`with_checks(true)`), rejects a start tag that repeats an attribute name. For
     each attribute yielded, the iterator compared the new name against every name
     seen so far in the same tag using a linear scan, so a start tag with `N`
     distinct attribute names cost `O(N²)` byte comparisons. There was no bound on
     `N` other than the size of the buffered start tag.
     
     ## Impact
     
     Any code that parses untrusted XML and iterates a start tag's attributes with
     the default duplicate check enabled can be made to spend CPU time quadratic in
     the number of attributes on a single tag. Because the check is pure computation
     with no `.await`/I/O, an I/O-based timeout on the consumer (for example a read
     or request timeout) cannot interrupt it while it runs.
     
     Measured cost of a single start tag, release build:
     
     | Attributes on one tag | Time |
     |---|---|
     | 80,000  | ~6 s   |
     | 800,000 | ~10 min |
     
     The cost grows with the square of the attribute count, so a start tag of a few
     tens of megabytes can stall a parsing thread for hours. No memory is exhausted
     and the parser does not crash; the effect is CPU exhaustion on the thread doing
     the parsing: a single crafted start tag can pin a CPU core for minutes to hours,
     denying service to that worker. A deployment that places a wall-clock bound on
     parsing, or confines it to a non-critical thread, may consider the availability
     impact lower.
     
     ## Affected code paths
     
     * `BytesStart::attributes()` / `Attributes` iterated with checks enabled (the
       default), and `BytesStart::try_get_attribute`.
     * `NsReader`, which resolves namespaces by iterating a tag's attributes and so
       reaches the same check internally.
     
     Consumers that iterate attributes with `.attributes().with_checks(false)` and do
     not use `NsReader` are not affected.
     
     This was reported as reachable by a remote, unauthenticated attacker in a
     real-world RPKI relying party (NLnet Labs Routinator) via a crafted RRDP
     `snapshot.xml`.
     
     ## Remediation
     
     Upgrade to `quick-xml >= 0.41.0`, where the duplicate check keeps the linear
     scan for start tags with a small number of attributes and switches to an `O(1)`
     hash pre-filter above a threshold, making the whole tag `O(N)`. The reported
     `AttrError::Duplicated` positions are unchanged.
     
     If upgrading is not possible and duplicate-name detection is not required,
     disable it with `.attributes().with_checks(false)` (this does not help
     `NsReader` consumers, which have no equivalent opt-out before 0.41.0).
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/tafia/quick-xml/issues/969
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.41.0 (try `cargo update -p quick-xml`)
   ├ quick-xml v0.37.5
     └── tools v38.0.0

error[vulnerability]: Unbounded namespace-declaration allocation in `NsReader` enables memory-exhaustion denial of service
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:72:1
   │
72 │ quick-xml 0.37.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0195
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0195
   ├ `NsReader` resolves namespaces by calling `NamespaceResolver::push` for every
     `Start`/`Empty` event *before* the event is returned to the caller. `push`
     iterated all `xmlns` / `xmlns:*` attributes on the start tag and, for each one,
     appended the prefix bytes to an internal buffer and pushed a `NamespaceBinding`
     (32 bytes on 64-bit) to an internal `Vec`, with no upper bound on the number of
     declarations.
     
     ## Impact
     
     A start tag with `N` namespace declarations drove roughly `3×` the tag's byte
     size in `NamespaceResolver` heap, allocated *inside* `quick-xml` before the
     `NsReader` consumer ever received the event and could inspect or reject it. A
     consumer that bounds its *input* size therefore still cannot bound this
     allocation: an `M`-byte start tag yields on the order of `3 × M` bytes of
     resolver heap the caller never sees.
     
     On untrusted XML this lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker force large heap
     allocations with a single start tag. With several `NsReader`s running
     concurrently on independent inputs (a common server pattern), the allocations
     stack and can exhaust process memory, causing the operating system to kill the
     process (OOM). This was confirmed against a real-world RPKI relying party (NLnet
     Labs Routinator), where concurrent RRDP validation workers parsing a crafted
     `snapshot.xml` exceeded the memory limit and the process was OOM-killed.
     
     ## Affected code paths
     
     Consumers using `NsReader` (which always calls `NamespaceResolver::push` before
     yielding `Start`/`Empty`), or calling `NamespaceResolver::push` directly. A plain
     `Reader` that does not perform namespace resolution is not affected.
     
     ## Remediation
     
     Upgrade to `quick-xml >= 0.41.0`. `NamespaceResolver::push` now rejects a start
     tag that declares more than `DEFAULT_MAX_DECLARATIONS_PER_ELEMENT` (256)
     namespace bindings, returning the new `NamespaceError::TooManyDeclarations`
     instead of allocating without limit. The limit is configurable via
     `NamespaceResolver::set_max_declarations_per_element` (use `usize::MAX` to
     restore the previous unbounded behavior), and `NsReader::resolver_mut()` is
     provided to reach it.
     
     There is no clean workaround for `NsReader` consumers before 0.41.0, as the
     allocation happens inside the reader with no configuration knob to cap it.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/tafia/quick-xml/issues/970
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.41.0 (try `cargo update -p quick-xml`)
   ├ quick-xml v0.37.5
     └── tools v38.0.0

error[unsound]: Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:75:1
   │
75 │ rand 0.8.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0097
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097
   ├ It has been reported (by [@lopopolo](https://github.com/lopopolo)) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
     
     - The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
     - A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined
     - The custom logger accesses `rand::rng()` (previously `rand::thread_rng()`) and calls any `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods on `ThreadRng`
     - The `ThreadRng` (attempts to) reseed while called from the custom logger (this happens every 64 kB of generated data)
     - Trace-level logging is enabled or warn-level logging is enabled and the random source (the `getrandom` crate) is unable to provide a new seed
     
     `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods for `ThreadRng` use `unsafe` code to cast `*mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>` to `&mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>`. When all the above conditions are met this results in an aliased mutable reference, violating the Stacked Borrows rules. Miri is able to detect this violation in sample code. Since construction of [aliased mutable references is Undefined Behaviour](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/nomicon/references.html), the behaviour of optimized builds is hard to predict.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/pull/1763
   ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.10.1 OR <0.10.0, >=0.9.3 OR <0.9.0, >=0.8.6 (try `cargo update -p rand`)
   ├ rand v0.8.5
     └── (dev) libdd-common v5.1.0
         └── tools v38.0.0

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

Updated: 2026-07-31 08:15:15 UTC | Commit: 5c588fd | dependency-check job results

@dd-oleksii
dd-oleksii self-requested a review July 30, 2026 11:47
Comment thread libdd-ffe-ffi/Cargo.toml Outdated
Comment thread libdd-ffe-ffi/CHANGELOG.md Outdated
Comment thread libdd-ffe/Cargo.toml
name = "datadog-ffe"
version = "1.0.0"
name = "libdd-ffe"
version = "0.1.0"

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major: any reason this is downgraded to sub 1?

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It's to avoid that the release system will publish a 2.0.0 version. The release system works on the assumption that every crate on the workspace stays in beta until it's published because it doesn't track which crates are published and which aren't so if I leave the 1.0.0 the system will bump the major and a 2.0.0 version will appear as a the first release in crates.io.
It's something we could improve in the future though

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Then we need to decrease libdd-ffe-ffi crate version as well?

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It's not needed, at the moment, we're not publishing the ffi crates since the ffi library is consumed via the released artifacts or by tag reference to libdd-profiling-ffi crate (which is the one that manages the inclusion of the rest of the crates).
In the future if we publish the ffi crates we will need to do it but we're in thinking about how to rearchitecture the whole thing.

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