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Security: Asmodeus14/ChronoStack

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Project status

ChronoStack is in its design phase. No releases exist, so there is no deployed code that could contain a vulnerability yet. This policy defines how security will be handled from the first release onward. Design-level security concerns are welcome now.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public issues, discussions or pull requests.

Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting: open the repository's Security tab and click "Report a vulnerability". It is enabled for this repository. There is no separate email contact.

Please include:

  • the affected component (CLI, clockd, preload library, MCP server, SDK);
  • the version or commit;
  • reproduction steps;
  • the impact you have identified.

What to expect

These are targets; the project has no maintainer team yet, so please be patient:

  • acknowledgement within 7 days;
  • an initial assessment within 14 days;
  • coordinated disclosure: we agree on a disclosure date with you, normally within 90 days of the report, or sooner once a fix is released;
  • credit in the release notes, unless you prefer to remain anonymous.

Supported versions

Version Supported
None released —

Planned policy:

  • Before 1.0, only the latest minor release receives security fixes.
  • From 1.0, the latest minor release plus the previous one, for 6 months.

Security boundaries (by design)

  • ChronoStack must never change the host or VM operating-system clock. It does not use settimeofday/clock_settime and does not request CAP_SYS_TIME.
  • It needs no privileged containers, and no container receives the Docker socket.
  • The controller API binds to 127.0.0.1 only and requires a per-session random token stored with user-only permissions.
  • The MCP server uses stdio only, exposes a fixed tool set, and cannot execute arbitrary commands. Only triggers declared in chronostack.yml can run.
  • Reports and logs never include environment variables, and they redact likely secrets.

Any behaviour that breaks these boundaries is a security vulnerability.

Known architectural risks

  • Preload library in every process. A bug in libchronoclock could crash or hang processes in your stack, including databases. Mitigations:
    • a minimal, allocation-free design;
    • fail-open by default;
    • a dedicated no-hang test suite.
  • Triggers execute commands. chronostack.yml triggers run commands in your containers. They carry the same trust level as docker compose up on that repository. Review them before running.
  • Virtual timestamps persist. Data written while time is shifted stays in ChronoStack's volumes. Never point ChronoStack at a database holding data you care about.
  • Local API. Any process running as your user can read the session token and change the virtual clock.

Details: docs/SECURITY_AND_RELIABILITY.md

There aren't any published security advisories